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1 
ARTICLES 
WHAT’S IN A NAME?  TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AS BYSTANDERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JENA MARTIN AMERSON†
INTRODUCTION 
 
“You said we were Namers.  I still don’t know:  what is a 
Namer?” 
“I’ve told you.  A Namer has to know who people are, and who 
they are meant to be.”1
The concept of naming is a powerful one.  By naming a thing, 
the namer provides it with a sense of belonging, a 
characterization.  By giving something that had previously been 
unidentified a name, the namer immediately imbues it with a set 
of characteristics.  The name has powerful connotations:  It can 
provide people with instant recognition based on a shared 
understanding. 
 
But there is also a danger in the act.  If, instead of naming, 
the would-be namer labels—that is, imbues it with a quickly 
formulated, thoughtless identifier—then it does not provide 
people with a sound understanding of the thing, be it person or 
concept, that the labeler is trying to contextualize.  In our sound- 
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Brittany Johnson and Daniel Burns for their dedicated research assistance on this 
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during that time. I would also like to thank the staff at the St. John’s Law Review, 
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much better. Finally, funding was provided by the Bloom Junior Faculty Research 
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1 MADELEINE L’ENGLE, A WIND IN THE DOOR 111 (Square Fish 2007) (1973) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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bite culture, many are content to simply stop at the label, 
without looking deeper into the nuances and complexities that 
come from being named. 
And so it is here.  Transnational corporations (“TNCs”) are 
unique in the international arena.  They are not state actors and 
do not create law as state actors do.  TNCs, however, with their 
vast economic multi-jurisdictional influence, wield an enormous 
amount of power in the international social, economic, and legal 
arena.2  The rise of their power and influence has coincided with 
their increased involvement in human rights-related issues.  And 
yet, TNCs consistently reject the notion of their active 
participation or complicity in these events.  In doing so, TNCs are 
labeling themselves “bystanders” under international law.3
Using the label of “bystander” is significant because, implicit 
in this name is a lack of culpability.  This label often conjures up 
images of an innocent bystander.  As such, when TNCs employ 
this rhetoric, they are tapping into a ready-set cloister of 
assumptions that helps to distance them from the underlying act, 
while simultaneously providing them with a basis for arguing a 
lack of culpability.  They are the innocent bystanders whose 
hands are never dirty. 
 
By giving TNCs the “bystander” name, this Article attempts 
to take the rhetoric out of its sound-bite environment and 
examine it for what it is: a strategy with implications for 
corporate accountability.  This Article attempts to distinguish the 
“bystander” label that TNCs employ, which conveys the idea of 
the innocent bystander, and the name of the bystander that this 
Article would like to adopt, which contemplates a party that is 
complicit to the underlying action even when it is inactive.  The 
term “rhetoric” employed throughout this Article is used as a 
more generic term for discussions of TNCs within the 
international discourse.4
 
2 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 57–58 (2002). 
  To the author’s knowledge, no one has 
3 To the author’s knowledge, no TNC has explicitly used the name of “bystander” 
to describe its relationship within the international community. 
4 This Article will employ the term “bystander rhetoric” or “bystander theory.” 
These terms encompass three interrelated concepts. First, in matters pertaining to 
actual litigation, it is, at its most basic, the defense or legal strategy that TNCs 
implicitly employ. Second, in the community, it encompasses the public relations 
strategy that TNCs employ when discussing their role in relation to human rights 
incidents. Third, at its most fundamental, it imbues the internal culture of the TNC. 
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ever used the bystander paradigm within the context of corporate 
accountability.  Some scholars have discussed the role of 
bystanders within a larger accountability framework.5
I. KEN WIWA’S STORY 
  However, 
the bystander framework has not yet been applied to issues of 
corporate accountability.  This Article attempts to fill that gap by 
offering a new theoretical perspective, one that names the TNC 
as a “bystander” under international law.  Giving the TNCs this 
name is important, because it allows us to move beyond the 
current framework—or lack thereof—for corporate accountability 
and instead move towards a realistic solution for TNCs under 
international law.  
On November 10, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian protestor 
and eight of his compatriots were executed by the Nigerian 
government.6  Their crime?  Protesting environmental practices 
by gasoline companies—particularly Shell Oil—operating in the 
Niger Delta.7  The Nigerian government barred all outside 
media, but representatives from Shell were allowed to attend the 
trial.8
Since then, the trials and execution have been roundly 
condemned.  John Major, Britain’s Prime Minister at the time, 
called the incident “an unjust sentence . . . followed by judicial  
 
 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, 8 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 373, 380–81 (2010) (discussing the possible effects of holding 
bystanders liable in a criminal context); Laurel Fletcher, From Indifference to 
Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1013, 1014–18 (2005) (discussing the possible effects of holding bystanders liable 
under international law in the wake of genocide). 
6 See Nigeria Democracy Act, H.R. 2697, 104th Cong. § 2(1) (1995). 
7 See Meredith Griffiths, Shell Pays $19.5m over Saro-Wiwa Case (June 9, 2009, 
5:09 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/06/09/2593497.htm. According to 
the complaint filed against Shell in the aftermath of the executions, no formal 
charges were ever levied against Saro-Wiwa. See Demand for Jury Trial & 
Complaint for Summary Execution; Crimes Against Humanity; Torture; Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment; Arbitrary Arrest; and Detention; Wrongful 
Death; Assault and Battery; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress; Negligence, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006) (No. 96 Civ. 8386), 1996 WL 33663676 [hereinafter 
Demand for Jury Trial & Complaint]. 
8 See Robert Stone et al., Letter to the Editors, The Case of Ken Saro-Wiwa, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, Apr. 20, 1995, at 71. 
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murder.”9  Leaders from the Nigerian government have been held 
accountable by the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights.10
Following the executions, Shell issued a statement that read 
in part as follows:  “We are concerned about, and sympathise 
with, many of the grievances felt by the people of the oil 
producing Niger Delta . . . .”
 
11  However, Shell stated that “as a 
multinational company . . . to interfere in such processes, 
whether political or legal, in any country would be wrong.”12
Shell’s language is the language of the “bystander.”  Shell 
did not deny that the underlying action occurred; rather it denied 
any involvement in the acts that would lead to culpability either 
in the environmental claim or in the events that led to the 
execution.  It concluded its rhetoric by stating that it was 
inappropriate to get involved.  In the immediate aftermath of the 
executions, no methods of accountability were implemented 
against the company—it continued with business as usual.
  
13
 
9 See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Nigerian Execution (PBS television broadcast 
Nov. 10, 1995) (transcript), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/ 
africa_11-10b.html); see also Nicholas Wood, Nigeria Faces Expulsion for Hanging 
Nine, TIMES (London), Nov. 11, 1995.  
 
10 See KINGAH STEPHEN, PROTECTING AFRICAN PEOPLE AGAINST PRIVATE 
VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: WHAT CAN THE NEW AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS DO TO CHECK THE ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
(TNCS)? 25 (2004), available at http://www.dhdi.free.fr/recherches/droithomme/ 
articles/stephenafricanrights.pdf. 
11 Press Release, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria, Execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and His Co-Defendants (last visited Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.crudeimpact. 
com/page.asp?content_id=13895. The press release was made in reaction to Nigeria’s 
execution of playwright and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa the previous Friday, November 
10, 1995. Gary Borg, Shell Red-faced over Nigeria, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1995, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-11-14/news/9511140321_1_shell-nigeria-
dutch. 
12 In fact, Shell did intervene—after the sentence it appealed to the Head of 
State for clemency. See id. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “PERMANENT 
TRANSITION”: CURRENT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA (1996), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Nigeria.htm. 
13 See Steve Crawshaw & James Roberts, Pressure Mounts for Nigeria Oil Ban, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 13, 1995, at 1; see also John Vidal, Niger Delta: Shell’s 
Annus Horribilis, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 10, 2010, at 21 (describing the measures 
Shell took after the executions). Since that time, an action was brought under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) on behalf of Ken Wiwa and others in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that Royal 
Dutch Shell and its subsidiary, Shell Nigeria, were complicit in, among other things, 
the torture and abuse of the Nigerian activists. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
Nos. 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 04 Civ. 2665(KMW)(HBP), 2008 WL 591869, at *1–2 
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Shell’s statement is not atypical.  This is the standard 
rhetoric that TNCs use when responding to human rights 
violations that happen on their watch.14  It is this rhetoric that 
has been, to date, largely unexamined.  In essence, TNCs such as 
Shell are claiming a “bystander” status.  Currently, TNCs use the 
“bystander” label as a proxy for the concept of the innocent 
bystander.  According to TNC rhetoric, their role as an observer 
to the human rights atrocities was that of an impartial observer, 
at the scene by happenstance, and powerless to stop the tragedy 
that was happening on the ground.15
TNCs often get involved in relationships with state actors 
who violate international human rights.
  This is significant because, 
until the nature of the rhetoric is identified, TNCs will be able to 
shape the debate.  
16  TNCs then argue that 
they cannot be held accountable for the violations because they 
merely observed the underlying atrocities and did not participate 
in the acts that caused them.17
 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008). The matter was originally dismissed at the district court 
level. Id. The dismissal was reversed by the Second Circuit. Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum 
Dev. Co. of Nig., 335 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2009). Subsequently, on June 8, 2009, the 
parties settled the action for $15.5 million. Press Release, Shell Nig., Shell Settles 
Wiwa Case with Humanitarian Gesture (June 8, 2009), http://www.shell.com.ng/ 
home/content/nga/aboutshell/media_centre/news_and_media_releases/2009/saro_wi
wa_case.html. Notably, Shell was not found legally liable. In its press release 
announcing the settlement of the case, Shell once again invoked the language of the 
bystander, stating, “Shell today agreed to settle a court case in New York related to 
allegations in connection with the Nigerian military government’s execution of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa.” Id. (emphasis added). Shell further stated that, “ ‘[the company] has 
always maintained [that] the allegations were false. While we were prepared to go to 
court to clear our name, we believe the right way forward is to focus on the future for 
Ogoni people.’ ” Id. For further discussion of the case against Shell, see discussion 
infra Part III. 
  Much of the literature that 
examines these relationships merely analyzes issues of corporate 
14 See Alison Lindsay Shinsato, Increasing the Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations for Environmental Harms: The Petroleum Industry in Nigeria, 4 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 186, 190 (2005). 
15 See id.; see also Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 156–57 (1997); Press Release, Shell Petroleum Dev. 
Co. of Nig., supra note 11. 
16 See, e.g., Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth 
Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 576 (2008) 
(discussing how Yahoo! executives provided email and personal information to the 
Chinese government regarding a journalist that was later used to incarcerate the 
journalist).  
17 See, e.g., Paul Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Jan. 24, 2005, at 63. 
CP_Amerson (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:06 PM 
6 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1   
accountability.18  In doing so, the literature fails to examine the 
rhetoric that TNCs are employing.19
Part II examines the concept of the bystander to develop a 
coherent foundation for how bystander rhetoric is studied and 
analyzed.  This Part also explores the bystander paradigm on a 
number of different fronts—psychological, social, and legal—and 
examines what parallels can be drawn between the human 
bystander and the TNC bystander. 
  This is a crucial oversight, 
because without starting from the language of the TNC, one can 
never address a solution that truly characterizes the actual role 
of TNCs.  Instead, advocates and TNCs will always speak at 
cross-purposes, never adopting the language of the other.  By 
failing to employ the TNC’s own rhetoric when developing 
accountability mechanisms, human rights advocates miss out on 
an incredibly powerful tool—beating the TNCs at their own 
game.  This Article attempts to move towards that measure of 
accountability by examining the bystander rhetoric of the TNC.  
Using a bystander paradigm, this Article examines TNCs’ 
accountability under international law.  
Part III examines a number of situations where TNCs 
employ the “bystander” label.  Drawing on U.S. corporate and 
securities law, this Article shows how corporate accountability 
and the bystander rhetoric are already interconnected in our 
current legal system.  Even in instances where TNCs are active 
participants to the wrong, this Part argues that bystander 
rhetoric is still being employed.  Using three case studies with 
interrelated facts, this Part also contrasts how the bystander 
paradigm can be viewed in the international arena. 
Part IV analyzes the current scholarship on accountability 
mechanisms for TNCs and analyzes how these concepts fall short 
because of a crucial missing link: the TNC as “bystander.”  
Finally, Part V discusses some of the questions that will 
inevitably be raised by naming the TNC as “bystander.”  
Specifically, how does the name “bystander” change how we 
think about TNCs?  This Part also discusses the limitations of  
 
 
 
18 See, e.g., Peggy Rodgers Kalas, The Implications of Jota v. Texaco and the 
Accountability of Transnational Corporations, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 47, 65–67 (2000) 
(discussing accountability issues for TNCs that operate in developing countries). 
19 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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the name but concludes that, despite these limitations, this is the 
best method currently available for developing a system of 
accountability for TNCs. 
International law, as it stands now, does not adequately 
account for the TNC.  However, until a solution is developed that 
incorporates the bystander rhetoric into the debate, there is a 
danger that the issue of corporate accountability under 
international law will continue to stall. 
II. TNCS AS “BYSTANDERS” 
When one thinks of transnational corporations, the term 
“bystander” does not usually come to mind.  TNCs are powerful 
entities, wielding a large amount of authority and influence, 
oftentimes accumulating more wealth than the countries that 
host them.20  However, on closer inspection, the implied language 
that TNCs are using as bystanders seems particularly well 
adapted to the context of international law.21  Typically, non-
state actors are discussed as objects of international law.22  
Although this confined view of international law as between 
states is changing,23 international law still does not adequately 
capture the concept of the TNC.  For good or for bad, the TNC 
has no explicit voice and no liability under current international 
law.24
Comparing the TNC to the classic bystander takes the TNC 
out of its typical setting.  Although usually equated with someone 
who is innocent, a bystander can, in fact, be seen as either 
morally innocent or morally culpable.
 
25  Under generally accepted 
norms, however, the bystander is not legally liable.26
 
20 Stephens, supra note 2, at 57 (“Corporations have grown to a level of economic 
power that dwarfs most nation-states.”). 
  So too, a 
21 See Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 23 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 314, 317 & n.9 (2005). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. at 316 (writing on the transition of international law from a vehicle 
between states to a forum for non-state actors as well). 
24 See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 
512 (2008). 
25 See generally VICTORIA J. BARNETT, BYSTANDERS: CONSCIENCE AND 
COMPLICITY DURING THE HOLOCAUST (2000) (discussing some of the complicity 
issues raised by bystanders during the Holocaust). 
26 See, e.g., Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Mass. 1951) (“It is 
well settled common law that a mere bystander incurs no liability where he fails to 
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TNC can be seen as good or bad, aware of the underlying human 
rights violations or not.  The current framework of international 
law, however, does not have a standard by which to impose 
liability on the TNC even when it engages in affirmative human 
rights violations.27  In addition, there are a wide range of actions 
in which an individual can engage in that nevertheless allows the 
person to maintain a “bystander” status.28  Likewise, the TNC as 
“bystander” can be defined through many different behavioral 
paradigms.29
There are two important distinctions between TNCs and 
individuals for the purposes of a bystander analysis.  First, 
traditional bystanders are much more localized.  They are tied to 
a particular area; moving outside of the community where the 
violations occur is not always possible.  In contrast, by their 
nature, TNCs are much more transient.  They have power over 
which communities to enter and can choose to be a part of a 
community or not.
 
30  Second, in the vast majority of cases, TNCs 
wield far more influence and power in the communities in which 
they reside than a typical bystander.31
Much of the rhetoric that TNCs employ when discussing 
issues of corporate accountability is a variation on a bystander 
theme.  Rarely do TNCs deny the existence of the underlying 
violation.  Instead, they argue that their complicity in these 
  Therefore, any discussion 
of the TNC as “bystander” must take this power differential into 
account.   
 
take any action, however negligently or even intentionally, to rescue another in 
distress.”). 
27 See, e.g., Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights 
Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 315 (2008) 
(“Corporations cannot generally be prosecuted before international criminal courts, 
and current international law does not generally impose criminal responsibility on 
corporations.”). Of course, there is a distinction between criminal and civil law for 
the purposes of assessing aiding and abetting liability. However, a full analysis of 
this is outside the scope of this Article. 
28 See LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, THE BYSTANDER: BEHAVIOR, LAW, ETHICS 7 
(1978). 
29 For an example of some behavioral paradigms, see discussion infra Part III. 
30 See, e.g., William L. Bricker, Jr. et al., Use of Hybrids in International Tax 
Planning: Past, Present and Future, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 79, 95 
(1998). 
31 See, e.g., The Legacy of Louis Henkin: Human Rights in the “Age of Terror”: An 
Interview with Sarah H. Cleveland, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 499, 513 (2007) 
(“Many multinational corporations have wealth, power, global reach, and influence 
vastly exceeding that of many states.”). 
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actions does not rise to the level of legal culpability.32  In short, 
TNCs argue that they were bystanders to the atrocities that 
occurred.  It is necessary, therefore, to understand the landscape 
of bystander research in order to fully examine how this research 
may be applied to TNCs.  This research will also help develop a 
theory of corporate accountability that will utilize the theoretical 
perspective of the TNC.  In addition, looking at TNCs as 
“bystanders” shows the current limitations of the law in this 
area.33
There is, of course, a peril in examining TNCs using the 
bystander rhetoric.  Even by exploring the rhetoric of the 
bystander, there is a risk of legitimizing any defenses that are 
based on this rhetoric.  Many would argue that the behavior of 
TNCs is well outside the practice of a bystander.
 
34  A true theory 
of corporate accountability, however, cannot be reached until a 
familiarity is gained regarding what TNCs are saying about 
themselves.  Any system of corporate accountability and 
corporate governance that does not take into account this 
rhetoric runs the risk of being regarded as obsolete by the very 
members of the international community needed to instill these 
mandates.35
 
32 See, e.g., Laurie Goering, Pollution Test Case Pits Ecuadorians Against U.S. 
Firm, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1996, at 1. 
  
33 See discussion infra Part V. 
34 See, e.g., Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N. Global Compact and Accountability 
of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
2 & n.4 (2007) (summarizing the various human rights violations in which TNCs 
have participated, such as supplying guns to guerillas and employing workers under 
sweatshop conditions). 
35 The United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the 
“Norms”) is a classic example of this concern in action. See generally U.N. Econ. & 
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Norms]. The aim of the 
Norms was to articulate a system of accountability and enforcement mechanisms for 
TNCs regarding abuses of human rights. See id. ¶ 1, at 4. Because of its intended 
binding nature, TNCs from across the world balked at their implementation, stating 
that it would be “unclear who would be the investigator, judge and jury assessing 
the performance of global companies.” Daniel Vasella, Business Must Help Frame 
New Human Rights Rules, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at 19. As a result of intense 
lobbying by TNCs, most states took a very muted approach to the resolution of these 
Norms, and they never became effective. See discussion infra Part IV.C for 
additional details on the Norms. 
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Moreover, examining the TNC through bystander rhetoric 
brings to the forefront some difficult issues regarding the scope of 
liability.  It is relatively easy to come to a consensus of liability 
when there is clear evidence of overt action by the TNC.  It is 
much harder to reach that conclusion when the TNC maintains 
that it is not participating in the underlying wrong.36  Looking at 
bystander rhetoric also underscores the reason why there is such 
a disconnect between the problem of corporate accountability and 
any solution, which must encompass corporate responsibility to 
be successful:  If TNCs see themselves only as bystanders, they 
will be less likely to change.  In addition, the language being 
used by advocates assumes some degree of action by TNCs.37
Finally, an examination of the bystander rhetoric helps to 
explain the flexibility TNCs have in evading corporate 
accountability.  Because a TNC is, in essence, a legal person 
being controlled by another person or group of people, at some 
point—even when the individual representative acts on behalf of 
a TNC—the TNC can still make the claim of being a bystander, 
disclaiming responsibility for the atrocities committed in its 
name.
  
Since, in large part, TNCs deny that claim, the debate inevitably 
stalls.  
38  Because TNCs do not view themselves as culpable, any 
instruments that TNCs help to craft are usually “couched in 
broad and vague language” and particularly designed to be 
unenforceable.39
A. A Theory of Bystanders 
   
At its heart, a bystander is someone who bears witness to an 
act, but takes no steps to intervene.40
 
36 See Regina Kreide, The Obligations of Transnational Corporations in the 
Global Context: Normative Grounds, Real Policy, and Legitimate Governance, 4 
ETHICS & ECON. 1, 6 (2007); infra Part IV. 
  The bystander, while part 
of a lively scholastic debate in other disciplines, such as 
philosophy, psychology, and sociology, has received very little 
37 See, e.g., Goering, supra note 32. 
38 Cf. Laurel Fletcher, Facing up to the Past: Bystanders and Transitional 
Justice, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 51 (2007) (discussing the difficulty in 
acknowledging acts of atrocities committed in your name). 
39 Oshionebo, supra note 34, at 9. 
40 See Claire Valier, Complicity and the Bystander to Crime 2 (Ctr. for Study of 
Law & Soc’y Bag Lunch Speaker Series, Sept. 12, 2005), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7rj7808m. 
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attention in the legal community.  This could be the result of the 
black letter law, which, with rare exception, does not place legal 
liability on “mere bystanders.”41  In fact, the current legal 
scholarship is more focused on damages awarded to bystanders 
who have witnessed a violent act than on holding them liable for 
their inaction while doing so.42
Yet for all this, there is a tradition of examining the 
bystander in other disciplines.  By adding the bystander to the 
discourse when examining underlying atrocities, this tradition 
elevates an essential stakeholder from the background to the 
forefront, allowing for a more complete assessment of a myriad of 
situations that, at least superficially, would seem to implicate 
only two people: the victim and the oppressor.
   
43  Rather than 
viewing the situation in two dimensions, examining the 
bystander provides him with an active role as a co-creator to the 
situation he is witnessing.44
In addition, a thorough analysis of the bystander shows the 
variety of situations that can trigger the bystander rhetoric.  As 
one sociologist notes: 
 
The possible bystander situations . . . are many and varied.  
The cry for help may emanate from the lips of one individual or 
be a concerted plea uttered by large masses.  The event may be 
a minor incident or a major calamity, a crime or a natural  
 
 
41 Only four American states have enacted statutes requiring rescue by a 
bystander: Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Other states—
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, and 
Washington—have enacted statutes that require witnesses to report crimes they 
witness to authorities. Jennifer Bagby, Note, Justifications for State Bystander 
Intervention Statutes: Why Crime Witnesses Should Be Required To Call for Help, 33 
IND. L. REV. 571, 572–75 (2000). 
42 Usually, under American legal jurisprudence, bystander liability is assessed 
as the need to compensate the victim’s spouse or other family members for horrors 
that they witnessed being imposed on the victim. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 
A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994) (awarding damages to a bystander who had witnessed her 
partner’s death); see also Kathleen Andrews, Comment, The Next Best Thing To 
Being There?: Foreseeability of Media-Assisted Bystanders, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 65, 65 
(1987) (exploring the reasonableness of expanding an award of damages to 
bystanders who view events through the media). But see Fletcher, supra note 5, at 
1017 (arguing that the role of human bystanders within the context of criminal 
complicity needs to be further examined). 
43 See Stuart W. Twemlow et al., The Role of the Bystander in the Social 
Architecture of Bullying and Violence in Schools and Communities, 1036 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 215, 216–17 (2004).  
44 See id. at 217. 
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disaster, a momentary, fleeting event affecting a handful of 
people, or a momentous, continuous act embracing an entire 
community or society. . . . 
The bystander situation may be thus of varied types—the 
help sought and the response evoked cover a wide spectrum of 
possibilities.  Although superficially it might appear that the 
problem of the bystander is of only peripheral concern for 
society, the total impact of bystander activity touches on the 
very essence of a society, and helps both to form and reflect 
much of its true nature and the quality of its life.45
Particularly in cases where the underlying action involves a 
violent act committed by one person against another, 
incorporating the bystander adds a whole new dimension to the 
analysis.  For instance, some scholars argue that for the 
oppressor, having a bystander witness his deeds lends legitimacy 
to the violent act, because if the act was really so heinous, the 
bystander would step in and stop it.
  
46
In his groundbreaking work on the bystander, Leon Sheleff 
discusses the three types of scholarly works that have focused on 
the bystander: (1) studies that have researched the behavior of 
the bystander; (2) studies that have researched the legal position 
of the bystander; and (3) works that implicate the larger “social, 
moral, and philosophical issues,” including “the practical manner 
in which society may, apart from the legal provisions, create the 
conditions for fostering altruistic behavior.”
 
47  Naming the TNC 
as “bystander” implicates all three types of scholarship.48
1. The Behavior of the Bystander 
 
Most sociological studies that have examined bystanders’ 
reactions to certain situations have focused on why, when 
witnessing events, a bystander did or did not react to the 
situation.49
 
45 SHELEFF, supra note 28. 
  Out of this research, several different characteristics 
46 According to Vetlesen, bystanders, viewed from the different sides of the 
conflict, are the persons whose actions are either capable of halting their plan, as the 
perpetrators, or the only hope left for the victims of the violence. ARNE JOHAN 
VETLESEN, EVIL AND HUMAN AGENCY: UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE EVILDOING 236 
(2005).  
47 SHELEFF, supra note 28, at 5. 
48 Id. at 12 (“The problem of [inaccuracy] . . . becomes magnified tenfold in trying 
to assess with any degree of accuracy who the bystanders are . . . .”).  
49 See Mary R. Laner et al., Bystander Attitudes Toward Victims of Violence: 
Who’s Worth Helping?, 22 DEVIANT BEHAV. 23, 25 (2001). 
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of bystander behavior have been developed that have particular 
applicability to TNCs.  These include: diffusion of responsibility; 
bystander awareness and development of personal responsibility; 
and the setting—both physical and psychological—of the 
underlying action.50
One of the most studied aspects of bystander inaction is the 
apparent paradox noted in the murder of Kitty Genovese
 
51:  
Bystanders are less likely to act in situations where a large group 
of people are witnessing the same event.52  One concept that 
developed to explain this behavior was that of “diffusion of 
responsibility.”53  Under a diffusion of responsibility theory, 
bystanders are less likely to react because they believe that, at 
any moment, someone else will take action, thus relieving them 
of the responsibility to act.54
The characteristics of diffused responsibility seem a critical 
component in the bystander rhetoric employed by TNCs.  First, 
the sheer size of TNCs, with their locations spread across the 
globe, allows the TNC—and its employees—to push 
responsibility for the handling of an underlying atrocity to 
different departments.  Second, a related concept revolves around 
the structure of the TNC.  Most corporate structures consist of 
various departments with overlapping responsibilities for 
matters that implicate human rights.  Each department, in 
addition to human rights related tasks, has responsibilities that 
are more directly related to shareholder profits.  It is axiomatic 
that more direct financial considerations would take precedence 
by department heads—especially at the end of a corporation’s 
quarter—than such amorphous concepts as human rights.  In 
such a way, the system intrinsically lends itself to corporate 
inaction in matters relating to human rights issues.  So long as  
 
  
 
50 See SHELEFF, supra note 28, at 15–17. 
51 Kitty Genovese was a woman who was raped and murdered outside of her 
home in New York City in 1964. When witnesses were questioned about the event, 
one man responded, “I didn’t want to be involved.” See Stephanie Chen, Gang Rape 
Raises Questions About Bystanders’ Role, CNN (Oct. 30, 2009, 2:48 PM), http://www. 
cnn.com/2009/CRIME/10/28/california.gang.rape.bystander/index.html (quoting a 
statement made by a witness to the Genovese murder in a 1964 newspaper article). 
52 See SHELEFF, supra note 28, at 15–16. 
53 Id. at 13. 
54 See id. (discussing the research that was done on bystander behavior that 
places it as a response to a situation rather than as some sort of altruistic behavior). 
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corporate executives are unable to see how human rights matters 
relate to the corporation’s bottom line, corporations will always 
be predisposed to bystander inaction. 
Another studied concept of bystander behavior is the 
relationship between bystander awareness and personal 
responsibility.  Sociologists have theorized that in order for 
bystanders to move from inaction to action, they must be able to 
attribute a sense of personal responsibility to the event.55  This 
resounds particularly well with the naming of the TNC as 
“bystander.”  Just as positive social influences can encourage a 
bystander to intervene in the underlying action, positive social 
reassurance—in the form of publicity campaigns and 
negotiations—can lead to changed TNC behavior.56
Another factor that bears on the likelihood that a bystander 
will intervene in an underlying action is the setting where the 
action takes place.
  
57
[T]he psychological structure, or ambience, of a setting might 
also affect the production of pro-social behavior in a helping 
situation.  It seems reasonable to postulate that greater degrees 
of bystander intervention would occur in less structured social 
situations, that is, in settings in which the rules of proper 
conduct are neither explicit nor restrictive.  Thus, the weaker 
the situational constraints on the varieties of acceptable 
behavior, the stronger should be the tendency for bystanders to 
offer assistance in an emergency.
  Specifically, scholars have argued that the 
setting of the action impacts whether a bystander will choose to 
intervene.  For instance, researchers William Howard and 
William Crano stated:  
58
 
55 See John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: 
Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377–78 (1968). 
 
56 See WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., MEETING CHANGING 
EXPECTATIONS: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1999) (discussing how 
consumer power and concerns over various social issues have become “a force to 
influence corporate behavior”). But see Benjamin Fishman, Note, Binding 
Corporations to Human Rights Norms Through Public Law Settlement, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1433, 1447 (2006) (arguing that using publicity campaigns as a tool to change 
corporate behavior is only effective if consumers and investors change their buying 
patterns as a result of the campaign). 
57 See William Howard & William D. Crano, Effects of Sex, Conversation, 
Location, and Size of Observer Group on Bystander Intervention in a High Risk 
Situation, 37 SOCIOMETRY 491, 494 (1974). 
58 Id.  
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This concept is central in its application to the idea of the TNC as 
“bystander.”  Many of the underlying human rights violations 
take place in developing nations where the state actor is either 
(1) the main perpetrator of the underlying act or (2) unable, due 
to a lack of controls, to fulfill its duty to protect its individuals 
from a violation of human rights.59  In such a scenario, the TNC’s 
ability to influence the outcome of the underlying act would be 
particularly well suited.  Given Howard and Crano’s theory, one 
would imagine that the TNC would be more involved in stopping 
the underlying action abroad than here in the United States.  It 
seems, however, that the opposite result is true.60  The TNC—
freed from constraining legal norms such as strict environmental 
regulation—acts instead almost completely within its own self-
interests.  This crucial distinction may relate to the difference 
between the personality of the bystander as human being in 
contrast to the TNC as “bystander.”  Arguably, many human 
beings act altruistically, with some measure of self-sacrifice.61  In 
contrast, the TNC, in its corporate personality, shares many of 
the characteristics of a sociopath.62
2.  The Legal Culpability of a Bystander 
  
Under traditional notions of jurisprudence, a bystander 
cannot be held liable for failing to intervene because it had no 
legal duty to do so.63
 
59 See Philip C. Aka, Prospects for Igbo Human Rights in Nigeria in the New 
Century, 48 HOW. L.J. 165, 187–202 (2004) (documenting Nigeria’s persistent 
violation of human rights for the Igbo people); Anup Shah, Corporations and Human 
Rights, GLOBAL ISSUES (July 20, 1998), www.globalissues.org/article/51/ 
corporations-and-human-rights. 
  In addition, failing to hold a bystander 
60 See Shah, supra note 59.  
61 See Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy Is Not an 
Absolute Value or Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 892 (2007); Jerome C. 
Wakefield, Is Altruism Part of Human Nature? Toward a Theoretical Foundation for 
the Helping Professions, 67 SOC. SERV. REV. 406, 406–07 (1993) (arguing that the 
concept of egoism as a basis for understanding human nature does not reflect the 
self-sacrificing behavior seen in individuals). 
62 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT 
AND POWER 1–2 (2005). 
63 There is an interesting parallel between legal culpability and likelihood of 
action within the context of the bystander. For instance, sociological research shows 
that a bystander is much more likely to act when there has been a pre-established 
relationship that connects him to the victim. Similarly, Bagby discusses how liability 
is imposed upon persons “standing in certain personal relationships to others.” See 
Bagby, supra note 41, at 573. 
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legally culpable comports with notions embedded in our society 
that generally correlate liability with action—that is, overt 
malfeasance—versus inaction.64  Often, bystander liability can be 
avoided by raising the issue regarding what type of duty should 
be imposed upon them.  A duty to intervene?  A duty to report 
the act to the authorities?65
The idea of establishing criminal liability for bystanders has 
proved to be a challenge.  For instance, Laurel Fletcher discusses 
the bystanders’ lack of legal liability in the criminal context and 
explains why they fall outside criminal adjudication.
  
66
Implicated in the [wrongdoing] by their passivity, it is not 
unreasonable to ask whether bystanders should pay a price for 
their inaction.  The conventional response is that it would 
violate fundamental principles of fairness to impose criminal 
liability on a group that is morally but not legally complicit. . . .   
 
Bystanders have “done” nothing and therefore fall outside the 
ambit of criminal sanctions.  The law does not impose a duty to 
intervene, to rescue, or to prevent harm where doing so poses a 
risk to oneself.  A duty of altruism does not require sacrifice of 
one’s own welfare.67
This concept resounds even more so within the context of the 
TNC.  TNCs are, by their very nature, profit-driven machines.
 
68  
Rather than offering altruism as their primary goal, the typical 
TNC mandate has always been maximizing shareholders’ 
profits.69
 
64 Bagby offers four sociological justifications for holding bystanders 
accountable: (1) moral justifications; (2) civic duty as a justification; (3) the 
prevention of harm; and (4) the protection of public interests. Id. at 579–83. 
  While in recent years TNCs have recognized the benefit 
of being more responsible participants in the global community,  
 
 
65 See Kate E. Bloch, Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil 
Commitment—A Bystander Duty To Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929, 
945 (1987) (“The law can be employed to persuade the bystander to take 
responsibility. Law serves to inform behavior on a large scale, modifying attitudes, 
reinforcing moral impulses, and guiding confused or impassive bystanders.”). 
66 Fletcher, supra note 5. 
67 Id. at 1030 (footnote omitted). 
68 See Stephens, supra note 2, at 45–46 (discussing the debate regarding 
voluntary corporate responsibility mechanisms and arguing that, due to the nature 
of the corporate personality, TNCs would not be capable of making these altruistic 
decisions). 
69 Cf. Shane M. Shelley, Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006). 
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it is usually borne out of the recognition that, in today’s 
sophisticated marketplace, responsible members can be more 
profitable.70
Fletcher’s discussion of bystanders raises another interesting 
point.  Under this scenario, the bystander is defined by his 
inaction and his passivity in the face of wrongdoing.  It is difficult 
to imagine that the concept of “bystander” could be delineated in 
any other way; however, when discussing the TNC as 
“bystander,” this Article argues that there is a way to view even a 
TNC who actively commits a wrong as a bystander.
 
71
3. The Philosophical Implications of the Bystander 
 
According to scholars, there are certain ethics of a society 
that breed the necessary conditions to either help or hinder 
altruistic behavior by people who have no legal responsibility to 
act as such.72  This idea is echoed in scholarship that looks at the 
underlying social evils that bystanders witness.  For instance, 
according to one examination of evil in human behavior, there 
are three conditions that must be present for something so 
outrageous as the Holocaust to have occurred.  First, the violence 
is authorized by an official with a mandate to give such orders.73
 
70 Many companies, for instance, discuss issues of corporate social responsibility 
in a wide number of settings, including environmental issues, fair trade movements, 
and workplace habitats. This corporate social responsibility serves two purposes. 
First, it allows the corporation to attract investors who place a value on socially 
responsible initiatives—without losing other investors. Second, the measure taken 
often leads to a long-term increase in profits: For instance, hotels save money by 
reducing the number of times they must launder guest towels, which not only has a 
positive environmental impact, but also saves on labor and laundry products. See, 
e.g., LYNN SHARP PAINE, VALUE SHIFT: WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE SOCIAL AND 
FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 48–49 (2003) 
(discussing how companies with better social reputations benefit financially by 
decreased marketing costs, better market share, the ability to recruit better talent 
and, in some instances, the ability to charge a good company premium for goods and 
services). 
  
Second, the actions are routinized or given structure in codes and 
71 Additional problems arise when the corporate entity is deconstructed even 
further through the use of subsidiaries—each having a separate legal personality 
under the law—especially when the parent company and the subsidiary exist in 
different jurisdictions. See Binda Sahni, The Interpretation of the Corporate 
Personality of Transnational Corporations, 15 WIDENER L.J. 1, 1–2 (2005). In some 
circumstances, however, the liability of the subsidiary can be traced back to the 
parent. See id. at 2.  
72 See SHELEFF, supra note 28, at 75. 
73 See VETLESEN, supra note 46, at 16. 
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regulations that set forth how the violence will occur.74  Finally, 
using doctrinal mantras and ideology, the victims are 
dehumanized.75
These specific stages—particular to a modern society—are by 
their very nature fertile breeding grounds for the behavior of the 
TNC.  The bureaucratic entity of the TNC provides internal 
forces that make it conducive to taking a position of inaction 
when morally repugnant behavior—or even morally ambiguous 
behavior—is occurring.
  
76
Within this context of evil, as articulated in a modern 
society, the role of the bystander takes on new meaning.  
Traditionally, the concept of noninvolvement is “articulated as a 
determined refusal to ‘take sides.’  This stance of principled non-
involvement is frequently viewed as highly meritorious . . . .”
 
77  
However, underlying a more nuanced premise of “bystanders” is 
the idea that every inaction is an action.  As such, a failure to act 
has multiple implications.  First, it will make a difference in the 
underlying action.  Second, and arguably more important, the 
inaction will send a message to both the victim and the 
perpetrator.78
Knowing, yet still not acting, means granting acceptance to the 
action—if not wholesale moral acceptance, then pragmatic and 
factual acceptance in the sense that what is being done is 
allowed to be done without there being any action taken to help 
prevent it. . . .  In short, inaction here entails complicity.  It 
raises the question of responsibility and guilt on the part of the 
inactive bystander as depicted here.
  As Arne Johan Vetlesen notes:  
79
 
  
 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 235; see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 46–47 (documenting the rise 
of the TNC as a separate legal entity in the Western World). 
77 VETLESEN, supra note 46, at 235.  
78 This idea is at the heart of the concept of the TNC as “bystander.” The 
position a TNC takes in the community, whether through action or inaction, is 
invariably viewed by the community as a larger statement. Therefore, when a TNC 
that has the ability to intervene in an underlying event fails to do so, that action 
gains increased legitimacy.  
79 VETLESEN, supra note 46, at 237–38 (emphasis omitted); see also Twemlow et 
al., supra note 43, at 216 (“In summary we define the bystander role as an active 
role with a variety of manifestations, in which an individual or group indirectly and 
repeatedly participates in a victimization process as a member of the social 
system.”). 
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Moreover, when looking at the rhetoric of the TNC as 
“bystander,” it shows how TNCs often minimize their influence 
within the larger global community.  While TNCs may not be 
actively participating in the underlying behavior, their presence, 
as Vetlesen discusses, gives an enormous amount of legitimacy to 
the events that are occurring around them.  So although a TNC 
is a bystander, but it is a very big bystander whose intervention 
would undoubtedly change the course of the underlying events.  
That it chooses not to intervene in these circumstances makes a 
stark difference in the outcome.80
As both cause and effect of growing corporate economic power, 
the international and domestic political systems have 
increasingly relinquished their control over business.  Economic 
power carries with it a growing political clout.  Corporations 
play influential direct and indirect roles in negotiations over 
issues ranging from trade agreements to international patent 
protections to national and international economic policy.
  As Beth Stephens notes:  
81
This idea of the varied actions of the bystander and its 
influence on underlying events—even through inaction—is also 
elucidated within the discourse of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.
 
82
The most important point that is drawn from the discussion 
of the bystander is that the term “bystander” captures a wide 
range of behavior and actions.  While this may be seen as a 
shortcoming when developing a theory of accountability, the 
amorphousness of a bystander’s conduct serves as a clarifying 
lens regarding what and whose behavior should be held 
accountable and the current methods and shortcomings in 
advocates’ ability to do so.  For instance, for those activists who 
believe that any morally culpable action should be held legally  
 
 
  This concept is useful for providing a framework 
that allows TNCs to become a part of the international legal 
structure. 
 
80 Cf. VETLESEN, supra note 46, at 235 (comparing the non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) during WWII to bystanders with an enormous amount of 
influence, whose actions led to unique results for the underlying events). 
81 See Stephens, supra note 2, at 58.  
82 Although this is not usually the context in which TNCs are viewed as being 
complicit with human rights, there are certainly situations that could give rise to a 
TNC being a bystander to genocide. See, e.g., id. at 45–46 (discussing the business 
relationship between IBM and the German Nazi Party before and during WWII). 
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accountable—a current impossibility under the legal theory of 
bystanders—then one course of action may be to change the 
standard of liability for bystanders under international law.83
B. Bystanders and Self-Incrimination: On a Path to 
Reconciliation 
 
An important part of the bystander theory concerns how to 
reconcile bystanders with their community after an atrocity has 
occurred.  In her discussion on culpability for bystanders, 
Fletcher makes a number of noteworthy observations on the 
bystander’s process of reconciliation.  First, she states that “[t]he 
question is whether nonaccountability mechanisms can be 
created that will enable bystanders to confront and acknowledge 
their own roles in crimes committed in their communities.”84  
Second, she states that “[b]ystanders need to be pressed to 
acknowledge and confront the distance between, on the one hand, 
their implied innocence in [court] opinions and, on the other 
hand, their condemnation as betrayers by [people in their 
community].”85
These statements bring to light an important question under 
bystander theory:  How should we perceive a bystander’s ability 
to engage in self-incrimination?  Specifically, is it the role of the 
justice system to push bystanders toward introspection and 
accountability or is simply providing the tools and giving 
bystanders a role in the process enough for bystanders to engage 
in introspection and self-recrimination unaided?  This distinction 
is crucial because while the former is seemingly easier to 
implement, it is based on a faulty premise: that bystanders 
naturally want to embrace accountability.  
 
The elusiveness of defining bystander accountability applies 
even more so to the TNC as “bystander.”  The argument that a 
TNC, when faced with its potential wrongdoing, will take it upon 
itself to fix its behavior, is often met by justifiable skepticism 
within the international human rights community.86
 
83 See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1061. 
  Few believe 
that a TNC with admittedly self-interested goals will develop the 
necessary tools to address the particular issue that human rights  
 
84 Id. at 1059. 
85 Id. at 1075. 
86 Cf. Stephens, supra note 2, at 64. 
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advocates would like to see corrected.  As such, the proposition of 
making these very same parties the primary instrument to their 
own accountability seems fraught with peril. 
A corollary to this issue raised by Fletcher concerns the 
problem of the future behavior of bystanders.  Fletcher states 
that “bystanders are a critical segment [of the collective] that 
must engage in the social and political processes of reclaiming 
and rebuilding communities.”87  The underlying presumption is 
that bystanders must be reconciled with their communities.  This 
notion has interesting ramifications for the concept of the TNC as 
“bystander.”  For instance, there is the potential for bystanders 
to be integrated back into the collective without the process of 
acknowledgment and culpability having taken place.  Doing so 
could lead to potential recidivism on the part of bystanders if 
confronted with a similar situation in the future.88
The idea of self-incrimination as a process of reconciliation is 
based on the concept of human bystanders.
  In addition, 
while a goal with the TNC may be reconciliation, it would be 
defined differently for a TNC than for an individual. 
89  While both 
individuals and TNCs are persons under the law, the personality 
characteristics of a TNC, however, are more closely analogized 
with a sociopath than a cognitively normal human being.90
 
87 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1016. 
  As 
such, the traditional definition of reconciliation will not work.  
Reconciliation must instead be defined by demonstrative and 
measurable goals for complying with an approved normative 
behavior for associating with a community.  This might take the 
form of adjustments to previously harmful environmental policies 
or an increase in wages for the people who are creating its 
products.  It is not as necessary that the reconciliation of the 
TNC be viewed with the same sincerity as it would with the 
individual bystander who must interact on a personal level with 
the members of his community.  All that matters is that, once 
held accountable, the TNC does in fact comply with its professed 
efforts of social change. 
88 Fletcher does touch on this point when she notes that post-war Serbia is just 
as divided on ethnic lines as before. See id. at 1072–73. 
89 See id. at 1034. 
90 For an interesting look at the dissociative behavior of a corporation, see THE 
CORPORATION (Big Pictures 2004). 
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III. TNC ACTIONS UNDER A BYSTANDER THEORY: AN ANALYSIS 
There are three interrelated concepts of the TNC as 
“bystander” within the international framework that must be 
explored.  The first is the concept of the TNC as a passive actor in 
a situation where human rights violations have occurred.  In that 
situation, the TNC and all agents of the TNC can be said to be 
completely divorced from the violation.  The second notion is the 
concept of the TNC as an active participant in those acts that led 
to human rights violations.  In that situation, the TNC also 
employs the “bystander” label, in as much as the TNC, like all 
corporations, is essentially a legal fiction—no acts perpetuated in 
the name of the bystander can be effectuated without the 
participation of individuals.  In that regard, the TNC can be seen 
as a bystander as defined by Fletcher: a passive participant or 
willing accomplice of the crimes that are being perpetuated in its 
name.91
A third way that the concept of TNC as “bystander” can be 
analyzed expands upon the notion of the TNC as the sum of its 
parts.  This concept is mutually supportive in that, just as the 
TNC can be viewed as a bystander despite the participation of 
the individuals who are acting in its name, likewise the 
individuals who make up a TNC can be seen as bystanders to the 
actions of a TNC that are so prevalent and so widespread that it 
has become a part of the very fabric of the TNC. 
 
These three concepts are all distinct, theoretical visions of 
the way to view the TNC as a bystander.92  Each theoretical 
construct is prevalent in the current legal strategies used by 
TNCs and their employees.  They also have a great impact on 
developing accountability mechanisms for TNCs.93
Analyzing the bystander rhetoric through national examples 
and international case studies highlights the current 
accountability discourse regarding bystander rhetoric already 
 
 
91 See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1034 (discussing how some atrocities were being 
committed in the name of the bystanders).  
92 Practically speaking, these categories may not be so distinct. For instance, 
there may be situations where the CEO of a TNC commits acts that are so egregious 
and exerts so much pressure on others to do the same that he, in effect, changes the 
culture of the TNC. If the CEO continues at that corporation for an extended period 
of time, it would be difficult to separate the bystander from the actor. For the sake of 
clarity, though, I will treat each theoretical construct as distinct. 
93 See Lucy Kronforst, Comment, Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights Violations: Focus on Columbia, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 321, 334 (2005). 
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taking place just below the surface.  Each of these scenarios 
offers targeted approaches that delineate the various views of the 
TNC as “bystander.”  These scenarios also provide a theoretical 
framework that is already rooted in international legal theories 
of agency,94
A. The Passive TNC as “Bystander” 
 human rights, and corporate structure.  
This view is the most straightforward.  Under this construct, 
situations will arise where a corporation will act passively, 
witnessing the behavior of another actor—particularly a state—
while doing nothing.  An example of this type of TNC would be 
the controversy that took place with the Bolivian government, its 
people, and Bechtel Corporation.  When the Bolivian government 
decided to privatize its country’s water rights, it awarded the 
contract to Bechtel.95  Under the contract, Bechtel had the rights 
to all of Bolivia’s water, even its rainwater.96  As a result of the 
privatization, up to one quarter of each Bolivian’s salary was 
consumed by water bills.97  When the Bolivians protested, the 
government sent in armed troops to quell the masses, resulting 
in the death of one civilian.98
More recently, Exxon Mobil and its subsidiaries made the 
“bystander” argument in a summary judgment motion before the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
  Bechtel did not participate in the 
violence but was rather a bystander—a passive observer to the 
events that transpired around it. 
99  The 
case, brought by Indonesian villagers and their next of kin, 
alleged that soldiers who were employed by Exxon to maintain 
order for their pipeline brutalized and tortured the villagers.100
 
94 See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal To Amend the Alien Tort 
Statute To Provide Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 119, 139 (2007) (discussing agency theory within the context of TNCs 
generally and the Alien Tort Claims Act specifically). 
  
95 THE CORPORATION, supra note 90. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2008). 
100 Id. at 19. The fact that Exxon allegedly paid the soldiers for their job does not 
necessarily destroy the concept of the bystander in its argument. As noted above, a 
wide range of actions falls within the bystander framework. If the connection 
between the “action” of the bystander and the underlying act is distended, the notion 
of the bystander will still lie. Cf. Twemlow et al., supra note 43, at 221–22 
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Exxon, rather than arguing that the alleged torture did not take 
place, instead chose to concentrate its argument on the 
corporation’s inaction.  As Exxon stated,  
Plaintiffs do not . . . seek to hold [the] individual soldiers 
responsible for their alleged injuries.  Nor do they suggest that 
the Indonesian military bear responsibility for the alleged 
actions of its personnel, or that Indonesia’s state oil and gas 
agency, Pertamina (which, in accordance with Indonesian law, 
provided Indonesian troops to secure the gas facilities at issue) 
should be held responsible for their injuries.  Instead, Plaintiffs 
seek to hold [Exxon], a contractor to Pertamina and an operator 
of the gas facilities, liable for the wartime acts of the Indonesian 
military generally, and then seek to hold the U.S. Defendants 
liable for the acts of their independent subsidiary, [Exxon].101
Since then, Exxon has taken steps to incorporate human rights 
issues into its corporate governance policy.
 
102  The company 
insists, however, that its recent policy is unrelated to the 
lawsuit.103
Case Study 1: Ken Wiwa and Shell: The Passive TNC as 
“Bystander” 
 
The case of Ken Wiwa provides a mechanism for viewing 
TNC bystander liability under international law.  As stated 
 
(discussing the scenario where bystanders interlocked arms to actively keep people 
out of the fight that was occurring and encouraged the ensuing violence). 
101 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Dismissal at 1–2, Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16 
(No. 01-1357). This notion of disavowing responsibility has direct overtones with the 
studies on bystanders. See Twemlow et al., supra note 43, at 217 (“The community 
bystander role could be described as an abdicating one. Abdication then is avoidance 
of acknowledgment of the role in the bullying process by the abdicating bystander, 
who projects the blame onto others.”). For Twemlow, reconciling bystanders into the 
discourse requires providing them with the means and the environment to 
acknowledge their responsibility. As Twemlow writes,  
Dissociation is a violent process, therefore, and the goal of any intervention 
is the transformation of brute power into passionate statement and 
respectful communication. This requires a clear conceptualization of the 
group’s task from a perspective that does not permit scapegoating, 
empowers bystanders into a helpful altruistic role, and does not 
overemphasize therapeutic efforts with the victim or victimizer. 
Id. at 217–18. 
102 See generally EXXONMOBIL, HUMAN RIGHTS (2009), available at http://www. 
exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/human_rights_brochure.pdf. 
103 Cf. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 50 (“Acknowledging one’s agency is a very 
tricky business. It becomes impossible to talk about what one might do in the 
present without raising questions about what one could have done in the past.”). 
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earlier, Wiwa, a Nigerian activist, protested the presence of Shell 
Corporation in his region of Nigeria.104  Wiwa claimed that 
Shell’s pipeline construction and subsequent drilling wreaked 
havoc on the environment in Nigeria.105  Wiwa also protested 
against the Nigerian government, which, he argued, was reaping 
the profits along with Shell on the backs of the labor of 
Nigerians.106  In 1995, the Nigerian government executed Wiwa 
after a trial that many called unjust.107  A representative of Shell 
was present during the trial but members of the international 
press were barred from entering.108  As a result of Wiwa’s 
execution, the Nigerian government was excluded from the 
African commonwealth for three years until a new democratic 
government replaced the dictatorial regime that ordered Wiwa’s 
execution.109  Since then, the old regime has been brought before 
human rights tribunals, and truth commissions have been 
established in an effort to punish it for the death of Wiwa and 
other activists.110
While rumors circulated that Shell officials had bribed 
witnesses to testify against Wiwa, none of these allegations have 
been proven.
 
111
I and my colleagues are not the only ones on trial.  Shell is here 
on trial and it is as well that it is represented by counsel said to 
  As such, we are left with the scenario of Shell 
acting as a bystander to the execution of Wiwa.  The subsequent 
events follow naturally from this concept of bystander liability.  
As would be expected, the main actor, the Nigerian government, 
was isolated by members of the political community for three 
years.  Interestingly, the role of the bystander, Shell, was also 
discussed during the initial proceeding and subsequent events.  
For instance, at the end of his trial, Wiwa himself brought the 
Shell Corporation into the discourse.  In his closing address, he 
said,  
 
104 See Stone et al., supra note 8. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime: Nations Protest, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at A1. 
108 See Stone et al., supra note 8. 
109 See BBC News: Commonwealth Lifts Nigeria Suspension (BBC News 
broadcast May 19, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/347520.stm. 
110 See BBC News: Nigeria Examines Abuses (BBC News broadcast Oct. 24, 
2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/986264.stm. 
111 See Patricia Cohen, A Writer’s Violent End, and Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
2009, at C1. 
CP_Amerson (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:06 PM 
26 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1   
be holding a watching brief.  The Company has, indeed, ducked 
this particular trial, but its day will surely come and the lessons 
learnt here may prove useful to it for there is no doubt in my 
mind that the ecological war that the Company has waged in 
the Delta will be called to question sooner than later and the 
crimes of that war be duly punished.  The crime of the 
Company’s dirty wars against the Ogoni people will also be 
punished.112
While Shell remained outside legal liability, its role as a 
bystander was still significant enough to merit discussion and 
acknowledgment.  The subsequent coverage and media attention 
after Wiwa’s death demonstrated the type of pressure that can be 
used to bring about a process of self-incrimination—if not 
publicly, then at least privately—and reconciliation.
 
113
B. The Active TNC as “Bystander” 
 
Simply examining the passive TNC as “bystander” does not 
solve the equation because even in certain situations in which 
human rights violations have been actively attributed to TNCs, 
the TNC will still label itself an innocent bystander, standing 
helplessly by as individuals commit atrocities in the corporation’s 
name.114
Often in the context of regulating domestic corporations, 
there is the idea—promulgated by, among others, Harvey Pitt, 
former Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission—that corporations do not act alone.  Rather, 
corporations always have at their head some individual actor or 
actors that were responsible for the acts committed by the 
corporation.
 
115
 
112 See Press Release, GreenPeace Int’l, Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 Ogoni People 
Executed: Blood on Shell’s Hands (Nov. 10, 1995), http://archive.greenpeace.org/ 
comms/ken/murder.html. 
  Under Pitt’s tenure at the SEC, the Enforcement 
113 See, e.g., Press Release, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig., supra note 11 (“We 
withdrew all staff in January 1993 from Ogoni land . . . . Since then we have 
repeatedly and publicly stated we had no plans to move back into the area and 
restart production and that we would return only when we are assured of the co-
operation and support of all the Ogoni communities.”). 
114 See Kronforst, supra note 93, at 329 (discussing the defense claimed by Coca-
Cola relating to its alleged treatment of union workers). 
115 See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 22, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch540.htm (“One of the other elements that we are looking into is how to 
make corporate officers and directors more responsive to the public’s expectations 
and interest. We think the best way to do that is a two-fold approach: [F]irst, make 
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division saw an increase in the fines imposed on individual 
executives at corporations,116 as well as the institution of Rule 
13a-14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.117  Known as the 
“certification provision,” the rule requires that both CEOs and 
CFOs of all publicly traded companies personally certify that all 
of the corporation’s financial information “fairly present[s] in all 
material respects the financial condition, results of operations 
and cash flows of the [corporation].”118  Should a corporation’s 
financials be found to be fraudulent after this certification 
provision has been executed, the CEO and CFO can be held 
individually liable for those false financials.119
This concept is particularly interesting for TNCs and human 
rights advocates because it underscores the policy goals that each 
may offer in pursuing its aims.  For instance, human rights 
advocates may be uncomfortable with this theoretical framework 
because it potentially immunizes TNCs from liability and 
prevents them from taking responsibility for the actions that 
were committed in their names.  Meanwhile, TNCs may refuse to 
engage in any systematic changes to their policies because, by 
definition, these acts were simply performed by certain rogue 
individuals, and now that the individuals are gone, there is no 
need for TNCs to change.  Indeed, TNCs would argue that any 
subsequent remedies would be punishing the “innocent” 
parties—particularly the shareholders who would be hurt by 
subsequent declines in profits.
 
120
 
certain that officers and directors have a clear understanding of what their roles 
should be, and second, to apply serious consequences to those who do not live up to 
their fiduciary obligations.”).  
  This position is shared by many 
enforcement-minded regulators who believe that a part of 
116 See, e.g., Former Top Officers of Sunbeam Corp. Settle SEC Charges, SEC 
Litigation Release No. 17,710, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 
1623 (Sept. 4, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17710. 
htm (discussing the $500,000 fine imposed on Dunlap for his role in the fraud—the 
largest fine ever imposed upon an individual at the time). 
117 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2011).  
118 Id. § 229.601(b)(31)(i)(3) (providing the precise language of the Rule 13a-14 
certification).  
119 See, e.g., SEC Charges NIC, Inc. and Four Current or Former Executives for 
Failing to Disclose CEO Perquisites, SEC Litigation Release No. 21,809, Accounting 
and Auditing Release No. 3229 (Jan. 12, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21809.htm (settling a CEO and CFO’s 13a-14 charges). 
120 But see Editorial, Corporate Crime and Punishment, MULTINATIONAL 
MONITOR, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 6 (discussing why the idea of shareholders as innocent 
bystanders may be disingenuous). 
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“protecting investors,” the SEC’s motto,121 involves protecting 
them from overzealous governmental regulations.122
Finally, this concept of the TNC also has ramifications on the 
notion of reconciliation.  For instance, Fletcher states that, 
within the context of genocide, “[d]ifferentiating the ‘bad’ 
perpetrators from the ‘innocent’ members of the same nationality 
is thought to prevent public attribution of collective guilt and 
permit individuals to rebuild communal ties.”
 
123
Case Study 2: Ken Wiwa and Shell: The Active TNC as 
“Bystander” 
  Similarly, 
within the context of corporate malfeasance, there is a school of 
thought that attributing the conduct to certain individual “bad 
apples” as opposed to the collective aids in the reconciliation of 
the corporation to the larger community and allows the 
corporation to continue with its business. 
As stated earlier, during the Shell controversy in Nigeria, 
rumors circulated that Shell officials had bribed some of the 
witnesses to give adverse testimony at Ken Wiwa’s trial.124
In this situation, the individuals responsible could be 
targeted for prosecution, allowing the TNC to divest itself of the 
rogue actors.  This would also allow for the process of 
reconciliation to take place for Shell and the community, in 
  
While the rumors were never proven, the allegation provides an 
example of the second scenario—the active TNC as a bystander 
to the actions of its employees.  Presumably, the actions of the 
employees would have represented a one-time egregious act and 
not a pattern of behavior that transcends any one individual’s 
term of employment.  Under that presumption, Shell, the 
corporation, would make the argument that those individuals, 
although acting in the name of the company, were not acting on 
the company’s behalf, and that Shell was a bystander to the acts 
of the individuals. 
 
121 About, What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last modified Feb. 28, 2011).. 
122 See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Corporate Directors Forum 2007 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2007/spch012207psa.htm (“[O]ur regulations must not price those very 
investors out of our markets through burdensome regulations or eat up the fruits of 
their investments through nonsensical mandates.”). 
123 See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1021. 
124 See Cohen, supra note 111, at A1. 
CP_Amerson (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:06 PM 
2011] WHAT’S IN A NAME? 29 
whatever form the community believed would be effective.  
Perhaps it would take the form of compensation to the victim’s 
family for the role Shell’s employees played in the violations.125
C. Passive Employees as “Bystanders” to an Active TNC 
  
Doing so would perhaps alleviate some of the burden for the 
community, making it more willing to accept Shell back into the 
community while also providing a method of reconciliation for the 
company.  Of course, if the behavior manifested itself as a 
pattern of violations, the role of Shell under bystander theories 
would then move into the third category. 
A third concept of bystander seems to be inapposite.  The 
facts, on their face, are the same:  A TNC is actively involved in 
some malfeasant behavior.  In this situation, however, the theory 
behind the facts is different:  It is the TNC itself, through its 
culture, that is causing the human rights violation.126  The 
employees are mere bystanders, morally complicit perhaps, but 
only in the way that employees of a murderous regime are 
complicit in the slaughter, by pushing the paperwork along that 
makes the death of individuals easier to pursue.127  Although 
these people may be more morally repugnant, they are, under the 
law, still within the category of bystanders.  Fletcher 
contemplates this conception of the bystander when she refers to 
the standard definition of a “bystander” as “a person who is 
present at an event or incident but does not take part.”128
 
125 In fact, Shell did compensate the victims’ families after a suit was filed 
accusing Shell of liability under the Alien Torts Claim Act. See Press Release, Ctr. 
for Constitutional Rights & EarthRights Int’l, Settlement Reached in Human Rights 
Cases Against Royal Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009), http://wiwavshell.org/documents/ 
Wiwa_v_Shell_Settlement_release.pdf. The lawsuit was based on allegations of 
active bribery by members of Shell Corporation. Id. 
  This 
can also be extended to employee bystanders within the context 
of TNCs—that is, those who are witnessing their company’s long-
126 This concept of the culture of the TNC has particularly interesting 
ramifications in the field of international human rights. In much the same way that 
some states are arguing that human rights are not universal, TNCs can also argue 
that their institutional culture represents certain norms of both the TNC itself and 
the state in which it resides, and, as such, the “universal” human rights concept does 
not fit within the larger model. Cf. Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the 
Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L.J. 743, 747 (1996) (“Human rights and democracy 
in Asia differ, [Asia] representatives say, because its culture differs.”).  
127 See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1060. 
128 Id. at 1027. 
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standing practices, such as hiring sweatshop workers, but are 
neither condoning nor condemning such practices.   
This concept of “bystander” often plays out in the context of 
corporate fraud litigation.  For instance, in the SEC’s 
investigation of financial fraud at Sunbeam Corporation, the 
Commission charged the corporation with numerous counts of 
securities fraud relating to Sunbeam’s public statements in 
filings and press releases regarding its earnings and prospects.129  
The allegations depict a multiyear orchestrated fraud performed 
in an attempt to artificially boost Sunbeam’s revenue and make 
it a more attractive prospect for potential buyers.130  As a result 
of the Commission’s investigation, it filed suit against certain 
former officers and directors of Sunbeam Corporation.131  
Included among the defendants was Lee B. Griffith, Sunbeam’s 
former vice president of domestic sales.132  Griffith argued that 
his role in this proceeding amounted to little more than that of a 
bystander.133  Particularly, given his role in the corporation, 
Griffith contended that “[t]he Complaint does not allege that 
Griffith was involved in any of Sunbeam’s revenue recognition 
decisions”—the actions that were the basis of the fraud—
describing his role in the malfeasance that took place as 
“nonexistent.”134
Griffith’s defense relies on the bystander rhetoric.  Griffith 
does not contend that he was not there.  Nor does he argue that 
the malfeasance did not occur.  Rather, Griffith claims the 
“bystander" label—a present party, but passive to the fraud that 
surrounded him.
  
135
 
129 See Sunbeam Corp., Order Instituting Pub. Admin. Proceedings, Securities 
Act Release No. 7976, Exchange Act Release No. 44,305, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 1393 (May 15, 2001). 
 
130 See Complaint for Civil Injunction & Civil Penalties at 1, SEC v. Dunlap 
(S.D. Fla. May 15, 2001) (No. 01-8437), 2001 WL 34716841. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 7. 
133 See Motion To Dismiss & Supporting Memorandum of Law by Defendant Lee 
B. Griffith at 2–4, SEC v. Dunlap (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2001) (No. 01-8437), 2001 WL 
34716888. 
134 See id. at 3. 
135 See also Editorial, supra note 120 (discussing the use of deferred criminal 
prosecutions for corporations convicted of corporate malfeasance and the underlying 
rationale that it will avoid imposing harm on “innocent bystander[s]”—the 
company’s shareholders). The author offers three reasons as to why these claims 
should not apply. First, focusing attention solely on the shareholders does not 
consider the other innocent parties, such as the victims of the company’s 
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Given the SEC’s allegations of rampant fraud, the best 
course of action for both Sunbeam and Griffith to pursue was one 
based on a theory of “bystander.”  Similarly, the best strategy for 
the company was to depict the problems as the result of a few 
rogue actors.  The individual employees’ best strategy, in 
contrast, was to argue that Sunbeam’s culture was one of 
maximizing profit at any cost and that it was this cultural 
pressure that led to the financial fraud. 
Case Study 3: Shell and the Environment: The Individual as 
“Bystander” to an Active TNC 
The concept of Shell as a passive bystander does not apply to 
the underlying claims of environmental abuse made by Wiwa.  
The underlying environmental atrocities, however, can also be 
discussed through a bystander theory.  The Shell Corporation 
has long been seen as one of the main actors of environmental 
rights abuses.136  In country after country, the TNC has 
demonstrated a disregard for the claims of environmentalists 
that the company’s practices in capturing oil have resulted in 
untold damage to the environment.137  Moreover, these claims 
have been made historically about the corporation and its 
practices—transcending the tenure of any one individual 
employee or board member.138
 
malfeasance. Id. Second, the underlying fear for the “innocent party” is that “a 
convicted company will be forced out of business.” Id. The author, however, points 
out that, in fact, that rarely happens. Id. Third, the author argues that calling 
shareholders “innocent parties” is disingenuous because shareholders especially 
have benefited from corporate misdeeds. Id. 
  Environmental abuses that take 
place under this scenario must be seen as being committed by the 
TNC itself—namely, that the TNC’s culture historically has been 
so infused with callousness toward the environment that the 
individual employees are in effect bystanders to the violations 
committed by the TNC.  International accountability methods 
can, therefore, also come into play.  Litigation can target the 
corporation and document the practices that it has perpetuated 
136 See, e.g., Shell—100 Years Is Enough!, CORPORATE WATCH, http://archive. 
corporatewatch.org/publications/shell.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
137 See Shinsato, supra note 14, at 189 (discussing TNCs’ “enormous influence 
and their significant role in the degradation and destruction of the environment 
which subsequently harms human populations”). 
138 See, e.g., CORPORATE WATCH, supra note 136. 
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for years.139  Current corporate laws allow the TNC to be held 
criminally liable when its actions rise to that level of 
culpability.140
Conversely, for those TNCs whose actions transcend the 
work of any single individual and where the culture itself, and by 
extension the actions, can be attributed to the TNC, then 
international tribunals would also offer a mechanism for 
targeting and prosecuting the “guilty” party without ignoring the 
place of the bystander. 
 
IV. CURRENT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
The applicability of the issue of bystander liability has very 
real world consequences.  Because of the bystander rhetoric that 
TNCs use in addressing underlying human rights violations, 
certain accountability mechanisms are simply ineffective in their 
ability to bind TNCs.  It is therefore necessary to examine the 
current mechanisms available under international law to 
determine which, if any, can survive a bystander defense made 
by TNCs.141
Largely due to their unique status under international law, 
corporations have largely escaped proper accountability 
mechanisms sought to be imposed by scholars and advocates.
  
142
 
139 See, e.g., Demand for Jury Trial & Complaint, supra note 7 (“[Shell] ha[s] in 
the past and, continuing through the present, used force and intimidation to silence 
any opposition to their activities in Nigeria which include the exploitation of the 
petroleum resources of the Delta and spoilation of the environment there.”). 
  
140 See Arthur Andersen Indicted in Enron Probe, NEWSMAX.COM (Mar. 15, 
2002), http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/3/14/170156.shtml. 
141 Dhooge, supra note 94, at 132–33 (stating, “it is hardly radical to accept the 
notion that an entity directly participating in egregious human rights violations may 
be properly designated as a defendant”); see also Shinsato, supra note 14, at 186 
(discussing how TNCs have come to have an increased amount of power and 
influence in the international economic development arena, particularly thanks to 
“lax environmental regulations and what amounts to tolerance of human rights 
violations”). Different relationship scenarios that occur between TNCs and their host 
states implicate this discourse. One scenario involves the TNC doing something in 
flagrant violation of the host country’s human rights norms, with the host country 
being powerless to stop the violation. See id. at 187–88. Another scenario is where 
TNCs have been specifically asked to do something by a host state that is in 
violation of international human rights law. See Bascuas, supra note 16, at 576–79 
(discussing the incident with Yahoo! China and the reporter). A third scenario is 
where the host country, or someone acting in the TNC’s name, does something to 
violate human rights law.  
142 See Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power 
Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 412 
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The proposals for dealing with the problem have ranged from 
advocating corporate aiding and abetting liability to developing 
“soft law” agreements that are co-signed by TNCs.143
Part of the problem is the historic nature of the players—
both rights holders and duty bearers—under international law.
  
144  
While the status of international law has changed and will 
continue to change, it is still viewed primarily as a mechanism 
for states and by states.145  Even the addition of human rights to 
the lexicon in the last sixty years has focused on the rights of the 
individual vis-à-vis the obligations of the states.146  Non-state 
actors as “duty bearers” is still a new concept under international 
law.147
In addition, TNCs under international law offer unique 
challenges for human rights violations.  The concept of corporate 
responsibility has gained traction only recently.
 
148  Before then, it 
was accepted, even lauded, that TNCs’ sole focus and purpose 
should be on generating profits for their shareholders.149  As a 
result, most international laws governing corporations focus on 
traditional, business-related issues, such as trade, antitrust, and 
labor.150
 
(2005) (discussing the various “rule scheme[s]” that TNCs participate in within the 
international arena). 
  As one author notes, “laws that define human rights 
and those that shape standards for TNCs historically have not 
143 See infra Part IV.B. 
144 See Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The 
United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a 
Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 287, 290–92 (2006). 
145 See PETER FINELL, ÅBO AKADEMI INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
FOR ATROCITIES AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS COMMITTED BY NON-STATE ACTORS 3–5 
(2002), available at http://web.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/peter.pdf. 
146 See David Kinley, Human Rights and the Shrinking State: The New 
Footprint of State Responsibility (Jan. 25, 2010) (unpublished conference paper), 
available at http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/conference2001/papers/ 
kinley.html. 
147 Id. 
148 While this concept is beginning to change, see Part II.A.1, the idea of 
corporations being outside the dialogue of human rights is still entrenched in some 
institutions. See, e.g., Andrew Newton, Amnesty Interminable, ETHICAL CORP., Nov. 
14, 2006, at 28 (“It’s important that we don’t get involved in [human rights] in 
China, or any other countries we do business in.” (quoting Sir Fred Goodwin, CEO of 
Royal Bank of Scotland)). 
149 See Stephens, supra note 2, at 46. 
150 See id. at 60. 
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overlapped.  Corporate law primarily governs the actions of 
corporations but does not explicitly address the problem of 
corporate compliance with human rights standards.”151
A. Traditional Concepts of Liability 
 
1. Direct Liability 
The most typical types of accountability efforts involve court 
cases.  Litigants, drawing upon international law, attempt to 
extend liability to the TNC.  As one author writes, “[s]uch 
initiatives typically rely on an inventive combination of national 
and international law, but they frequently contribute to 
emerging international legal norms and standards. . . .  
Strengthened international criminal law, through the 
International Criminal Court and other developments, greatly 
assists this process.”152
International criminal or human rights courts offer a unique 
setting for the TNC as “bystander.”  Under the law of 
corporations, corporations can be held accountable, even 
criminally, as a distinct and separate person under the law.
 
153  
By delineating the corporation from the individual under a 
bystander theory, international trials can develop a cogent theory 
of liability that would hold the appropriate actor liable while 
addressing the needs of accountability and reconciliation, as 
defined above, for the bystander.  These mechanisms, however, 
are few.154  More often, even when TNCs have been found taking 
an active role in the underlying human rights violation, little is 
done to hold the TNC liable under international law.155
 
151 Kronforst, supra note 93, at 324 (footnote omitted); see also Stephens, supra 
note 2, at 54 (“The key characteristics of modern transnational business corporations 
developed piecemeal over the course of hundreds of years. This disjointed history 
explains the gap between the economic reality and the legal tools available to hold 
corporate groups accountable for their actions.”). 
  In 
152 See, e.g., James A. Paul & Jason Garred, Making Corporations Accountable: 
A Background Paper for the United Nations Financing for Development Process 10–
11 (Dec. 2000) (unpublished background paper), available at http:// 
www.worldsummit2002.org/publications/corporationaccount.pdf. 
153 See, e.g., NEWSMAX.COM, supra note 140. Although Arthur Andersen’s 
indictment was subsequently overturned, it was not because the company was 
legally unable to be sued, but rather because standards set for establishing criminal 
liability were too low. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Auditor Verdict in 
Enron Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A1. 
154 See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1028–30. 
155 See supra Part III.B–C. 
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addition, given the structure of the international legal regime, 
whereby legal instruments are often gap fillers to a nationally-
based mandate, prosecuting a TNC for a human rights violation 
under international law would raise a host of logistical 
questions.156
An inherent tension has arisen through the development of 
international law primarily as a body for binding state actors and 
the concept of fundamental human rights, which seems to give 
“duty bearers” a universal concept unlimited by borders or 
government.   
 
[I]t is patently clear that human beings have recourse to the 
United Nations, and not only to their nation states, since the 
formal, treaty-bound inception of international human rights 
law.  At the same time, there is an undeniable tension, or 
“disconnect,” between human rights theory and international 
human rights law.  “While human rights theory supports the 
claims of rights holders against all others, international human 
rights law treats the state as the principal threat to individual 
freedom and well being.”157
 
 
 
 
156 This concept, however, is changing. The TNC now tends to view itself as 
beholden to a larger constituency rather than simply to its shareholders. See, e.g., 
Andrew Newton, Beyond the Tipping Point, ETHICAL CORP., Nov. 14, 2006, at 5 
(“The earlier piecemeal approach [to corporate responsibility] is evolving into a more 
holistic one based around stakeholder groups, overseen by specialised corporate 
responsibility departments integrated into the corporate governance framework.”). 
In addition, shareholders themselves are insisting that a TNC’s mandate goes 
beyond mere profit increase to larger issues of social responsibility. For instance, the 
environmental lobby has been very effective in creating venture funds that invest in 
companies that are making strides to become environmentally friendly. See, e.g., 
Anojja Shah, Green Mutual Funds Ride Wave of Popularity, SMART MONEY MAG. 
(Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.smartmoney.com/smartmoney-magazine/index.cfm? 
story=march2008-green-mutual-funds&hpadref=1; see also David Weissbordt & 
Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 902 
(2003) (“There is also increasing reason to believe that greater respect for human 
rights by companies leads to greater sustainability in emerging markets and better 
business performance.” (footnote omitted)). 
157 Julie Campagna, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rule 
Makers, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2004) (quoting Dinah Shelton, 
Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 
281–82 (2002)).  
CP_Amerson (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:06 PM 
36 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1   
Or, as another scholar notes, “Once we begin to loosen our 
customary view that states ‘act’ and corporations ‘react,’ it 
becomes equally difficult to attribute responsibility for the social 
welfare effects of the regulation to any given actor.”158
2. Aiding and Abetting Liability 
 
While aiding and abetting liability for individuals under 
international law has been well established, the liability element 
for corporations is much less clear.  The main debate centers on 
how to apply the element of scienter, crucial for the issue of 
culpability, to a fictional entity.  Among the choices that have 
riddled scholars is whether it is enough to establish aiding and 
abetting liability if you can show that the actor simply had 
knowledge that its actions would facilitate the underlying abuse 
or whether there must be a purpose to facilitate that crime.159  
Given the difficulty, the issue becomes how to attribute such 
knowledge to a corporate entity.  One scholar argues for a specific 
intent analysis for human rights abuses committed as the result 
of a joint enterprise between the TNC and a ruling sovereign.160  
Other commentators believe that having the action done at the 
behest of the sovereign allows the TNC to escape completely from 
liability.161
The most significant flaw, however, with attempting to use 
an aiding and abetting model for TNCs is that it does not fit 
within the rhetoric that TNCs are using for themselves.  
Establishing aiding and abetting liability requires at least a 
showing of knowledge and possibly also purpose.
 
162  When TNCs 
claim that they are bystanders, they lay the foundation to deny 
both of these.163
 
158 See Danielsen, supra note 142, at 413. 
 
159 See Cassel, supra note 27, at 304. 
160 See Dhooge, supra note 94, at 133.  
161 See id. at 133–34; MANDY MACDONALD, INT’L RESTRUCTURING EDUC. 
NETWORK EUROPE, CONTROLLING CORPORATE WRONGS: THE LIABILITY OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 3 (2000), available at http://www.indianet.nl/irene. 
html (“Arguments on the grounds of sovereignty, however, are double-edged. 
Companies often use (or abuse) sovereignty as a pretext for devolving responsibility 
to host states . . . .”).  
162 See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 27, at 325. 
163  A bystander is merely a witness. As a witness, a bystander does not instigate 
or attempt to put an end to what the bystander was bearing witness to. By claiming 
to be bystanders, they cannot be liable for aiding and abetting because that would 
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B. Soft Law Approaches 
Mark Janis defines soft law as “rules which are neither 
strictly binding nor completely void of any legal significance.”164  
While “[t]hese may in time ‘harden’ ” into a legal binding pact, its 
hardening will mark its transformation into “customary 
international law.”165  According to Janis, soft law is always 
transitory and never a legally binding end unto itself, but at the 
moment that it becomes hardened, it becomes customary law.166  
The advantage espoused by proponents of soft law is that it 
provides the needed flexibility for those actors that have no strict 
demands on themselves.167  But this also highlights the difficulty 
in using soft law as a framework for corporate accountability:  In 
order for TNCs to be active participants in soft law, they must to 
some degree acknowledge their complicity in the underlying 
behavior.  Acknowledging their complicity, however, is in direct 
contravention to the bystander rhetoric that the TNCs have 
adopted.  If TNCs were to acknowledge their involvement in an 
underlying human rights atrocity, then they would immediately 
open themselves up to direct liability under various national 
regimes, if not under international law.168  In addition, 
participating in a scheme that presumes their involvement also 
would lead to a significant decrease in reputational currency in 
the international arena.169
One example of a soft law initiative is the United Nations 
Global Compact.  The Global Compact is “a strategic policy 
  As such, the inherent structure of soft 
law—as it stands now—would make it one of the least viable 
options for engaging TNCs on human rights issues. 
 
require assistance, facilitation, or promotion of the event—the bystander label is 
clearly contradictory to action of any kind. 
164 MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 52–53 (4th ed. 2003) 
(quoting 7 RUDOLF BERNHARDT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
165 Id. at 53. 
166 See id. 
167 See, e.g., Ann C. Wallis, Note, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley 
Process for the United Nations’ Development of Human Rights Norms for 
Transnational Corporations, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 388, 389 (2005) (discussing 
the Kimberley Process as a means for resolving the issue of conflict diamonds within 
the context of soft law norms). 
168 See Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool 
To Avoid Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better 
Business Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 55, 85 (2009). 
169 See Newton, supra note 156 (discussing how the change in self-regulatory 
corporate governance has paid dividends in reputational currency). 
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initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their 
operations and strategies with ten universally accepted 
principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption.”170  By its own mandate, the Global Compact is 
not “legally binding,” “a regulatory body,” or “a means of 
monitoring company behavior.”171  Instead, it is a “voluntary 
initiative to promote sustainable development and good corporate 
citizenship.”172  The Compact’s mandate extends beyond 
corporate accountability.  The Compact was created as a way for, 
among other things, TNCs to “improve [their] corporate 
reputation and brand image” and “network with other 
organizations.”173
One flaw occurs with companies who did not sign onto the 
Global Compact.  The idea of binding these companies, 
regardless, is both practically untenable and legally unsound.  
The notion of soft law, as discussed above, is even more 
controversial than customary law because it can lead to a “non-
consensual” source of international law that, in the view of some, 
may harden over time.
 
174  To believe that such a controversial 
source of international law can be forced upon corporations who 
did not even sign up to participate voluntarily seems unfeasible.  
In addition, with customary international law as it currently 
stands, actors have the option of “opt[ing]-out” of a custom simply 
by not participating.175
 
170 What Is the Global Compact?, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http:// 
www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
  
171 Global Compact Self Assessment Tool: About the UN Global Compact, 
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.globalcompactselfassessment.org/ 
aboutthistool/unglobalcompact (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
172 Id. 
173 About the UN Global Compact: Why Participate, GLOBAL COMPACT NETWORK 
NORDIC COUNTRIES, http://www.gcnordic.net/index.php?r=page/show&topicId=1 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). The key focus of the Global Compact stems from its ten 
principles, all of which relate to human rights issues. Overview of the UN Global 
Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http:// 
www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2010). 
174 See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 55–60 (Anthony 
D’Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996) (discussing the various methods for developing 
soft law, including “soft” enforcement mechanisms by international commissions); 
Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 443, 443–44 (1983). 
175 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International 
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 218–20, 220 n.72 (2010). 
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Finally, this approach to TNCs does not take into account all 
the individual actors that are involved.  As the bystander theory 
brings out, the human rights violation can occur through: 
individuals working on behalf of the company; the company’s own 
long-standing practices; and state actors with the company 
passively present.  Soft law’s approach seems unequipped to 
handle these variations.176
C. U.N. Norms 
 
International law has moved towards developing 
accountability instruments for TNCs.  The Norms on 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the 
“Norms”) were approved in 2003.177  The Norms differ from 
previous initiatives in two significant ways.  First, unlike 
previous initiatives that targeted TNCs, these norms were 
developed by the U.N. Sub-Commission with very little input by 
TNCs at their nascent stage.178  Second, as originally conceived, 
the Norms were intended to be a binding initiative, with 
provisions within the document related to enforcement 
mechanisms for noncompliance.179  These two facets make the 
Norms more closely akin to traditional national regulation, with 
a top-down approach to regulation, as opposed to international 
legal formation, which is usually viewed as a bottom-up 
approach.180  Although the Norms have arguably dwindled in 
legal significance since the appointment and report of Special 
Representative John Ruggie,181
 
176 See Weissbordt & Kruger, supra note 156, at 914 (“No one can realistically 
expect business human rights standards to become the subject of treaty obligations 
immediately.”). 
 an analysis of the Norms from a 
177 See Norms, supra note 35. 
178 See Weissbordt & Kruger, supra note 155, at 904. TNCs, however, were 
vociferous in their commentary after the Norms were presented to the full 
Commission for approval. See David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The UN Human 
Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International 
Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 457–58 (2006). 
179 See Weissbordt & Kruger, supra note 156, at 903 (“The Norms are the first 
nonvoluntary initiative accepted at the international level.”). 
180 See Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking: The Private Origins of 
Transnational Law, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 49, 53 (2008) (“[W]hereas top-
down lawmaking is a process of law internalized as practice, bottom-up 
international lawmaking is a soft, unchoreographed process whereby private 
practices are externalized as law.”).  
181 See Kinley & Chambers, supra note 178, at 459–61. 
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bystander perspective is particularly helpful since the language 
surrounding the debate in adopting the Norms highlights the 
bystander rhetoric that TNCs are employing.  To fully 
understand the significance of the debates, an examination of the 
language of the Norms is necessary. 
The Norms are explicit in bringing TNCs into the 
international human rights discourse.  The Preamble declares, 
[E]ven though States have the primary responsibility to 
promote, secure the fulfilment [sic] of, respect, ensure respect of 
and protect human rights, transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible 
for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.182
This marks a significant shift from prior international 
documents.  Not only do the Norms name TNCs as an integral 
part of the rubric for human rights issues, but they also explicitly 
bring them into the debate as “duty bearers.”
 
183  The Norms 
provide that TNCs, as part of the international community, are 
obligated to respect “generally recognized responsibilities and 
norms contained in United Nations treaties and other 
international instruments.”184
 
The Norms were drafted over several years by a working group at the 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, and involved extensive 
consultations with businesses, unions, and non-governmental 
organizations, including Amnesty International. . . .  
 
The Norms distill in one place the human rights principles applicable to 
businesses—referencing the Universal Declaration, Convention of the 
Rights of the Child, ILO conventions and many other existing international 
laws and standards, and clarify in operational terms what corporate social 
responsibility means for a company. . . .  
[T]he Norms do recognize that transnational and local companies carry 
responsibilities as well as States. 
Alexandra Arriaga, Dir. of Gov’t Relations, Amnesty Int’l USA, Remarks at the 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus Corporate Social Responsibility: Human 
Rights and Transnational Companies (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://www. 
amnestyusa.org/business/csr.html. 
182 See Norms, supra note 35, pmbl. 
183 Surya Deva, U.N.’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 507 (2004) (“The most striking feature of these provisions [in 
the Norms] is their treatment of TNCs, together with other state organs, as [a] 
vehicle of developing a society wedded to rule of law, transparency, accountability 
and sustainable development and in which people’s civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights are realized.”).  
184 See Norms, supra note 35, pmbl. The instruments specifically enumerated in 
the Norms include: (1) the convention on genocide; (2) the convention against 
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The Norms are forward looking, placing TNCs squarely 
within the paradigm for solving issues that affect the human 
rights of citizens everywhere.185  From a normative value 
approach, it takes a giant step forward in bringing the TNC 
within the legal discourse.  By providing for an expansive view of 
complicity that does not depend on overt action, the Norms offer 
the closest thing to a theoretical structure that encompasses the 
bystander rhetoric.  That is also, however, its greatest weakness.  
Because the Norms make no distinction between participation 
and complicity, they lump all behavioral paradigms into one 
grouping that triggers liability.  As such, they allow TNCs to 
capitalize on this lack of distinction by associating themselves 
with the label of innocent bystander rather than the name of 
bystander.  This provides a large loophole that TNCs will exploit 
again and again in escaping liability.186  Instead, what is needed 
is language that squarely addresses the label of TNCs and makes 
clear that inaction is also a form of complicity and that, as such, 
binding initiatives are appropriate.  If the rhetoric of TNCs is 
that they are bystanders to the underlying action being 
committed, then their participation in document after document 
that holds them liable for their active participation will be 
ineffective because it fails to address their defense.  Crafting a 
document or a set of norms that does not address this will be 
ineffective from the beginning.187
 
torture; (3) the convention against slavery; and (4) the convention attaching civil 
liability for oil pollution. See id. These conventions in particular are among the hot 
button issues that would specifically come within the gambit of dealings and TNCs.  
 
185 See Kinley & Chambers, supra note 178, at 458 (“A number of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and human rights advocates from 
around the world took various opposing positions to that of the business alliances, 
lobbying national governments and making submissions directly to the Commission 
in support of the Norms.”). 
186 Id. at 452 (“It is the very idea of an international instrument apparently 
speaking directly to non-state entities, as well as to states, which has caused 
consternation in some quarters . . . . [T]he Norms seek to extend implementation and 
enforcement obligations to non-state entities and provide novel mechanisms for 
ensuring that these obligations are met.”). Kinley & Chambers also discuss how one 
of the main objections to the Norms is the idea that TNCs might be liable for the 
deeds of its partners. Id. at 448–49.  
187 Id. at 454 n.23 (“In many situations the apparent violator is not a TNC but 
its subsidiaries, contractors or suppliers.”). 
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In addition, there is a potential conflict between these 
international documents and state law.188  This is exacerbated by 
the idea that, according to the Norms, states still maintain 
primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.189  As such, any conflict between international 
conventions and state doctrine will provide for the preeminence 
of the states.190  But what happens when the actions taken by the 
states are in direct contravention to the international treaty?191  
Liability for the state aside, TNCs have a built-in alibi:  Because 
they are guests in the host state, any actions that they take must 
abide by the laws of that state.  Therefore, if they are complicit in 
a larger phenomenon that was triggered by the state, then they 
are merely bystanders to the international law that may be 
triggered by the state’s actions.  Indeed, the language in the 
Norms seems to support this.  For instance, in article 1, “States 
have the primary responsibility to promote . . . and protect 
human rights.”192  The Norms also limit the power of TNCs to 
only those issues “[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and 
influence.”193
 
188 See id. at 466 (discussing the difference between domestic and international 
instruments—for example, that international litigation provides the general 
framework while domestic laws fill in the gaps).  
   
189 See Norms, supra note 35, ¶ 1. 
190 See id.  
191 Kinley and Chambers discuss this precise issue: 
In practice, the dividing of responsibility between the state and the 
TNC most often occurs when a government fails in its human rights 
duties. . . . The Norms do not purport definitively to establish binding legal 
obligations (although they do not rule out such an eventuality); still less do 
they purport to replace state responsibility with corporate responsibility to 
protect human rights. Rather, they establish that companies should not be 
able to hide behind governments that are failing to implement human 
rights, and deny any responsibility whatsoever for human rights violations 
in which they are involved or complicit. 
The Norms also cover the situation where a state not only fails to 
uphold its citizens’ human rights, but is itself the perpetrator of human 
rights violations. When this occurs, companies that work in concert with 
the state may find that they are complicit in the state’s wrongdoing. 
Kinley & Chambers, supra note 178, at 467–68; see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 
F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
without state action when the acts were committed in furtherance of genocide or war 
crimes). 
192 See Norms, supra note 35, ¶ 1. 
193 Id. It is this aspect of the Norms that, in particular, has been most critically 
denounced. Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www. 
unglobalcompact.org/Issues/human_rights/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) 
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D. Direct Attacks on the Construct of the TNC Bystander 
There are three ways for addressing the TNC as “bystander” 
directly under international accountability methods.  Each 
method is similar in that it directly attacks the concept of the 
active TNC perpetrator as being a bystander.  One method, 
which has already been attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, in 
California, is to dissolve the TNC’s corporate charter.194  Doing so 
would strip the corporation of its status, making it disappear 
under both law and bystander theory.195  Left without a screen, 
the individual employees of the corporation could be targeted and 
held accountable.196
The second method offers a similar though separate avenue 
of attack.  This method would expand the use of the “piercing the 
corporate veil” doctrine
  Meanwhile, the dissolution of the 
corporation would prevent any further atrocities from being 
perpetuated in the bystander’s name.   
197 that allows litigants, in certain 
situations, to penetrate the screen of a corporation and attach 
liability to the individuals directly.198
 
(“[C]ompanies are often uncertain how to avoid complicity in human rights abuse 
and where the boundaries of their human rights responsibility lie.”). 
  While this avenue is 
advantageous because it is already an accepted legal principle, it 
has its downsides: (1) the corporation would still exist even after 
individual liability attaches, and (2) the doctrine, in its current 
state, is applied only in the most egregious of circumstances,  
 
 
 
194 See Charlie Cray, Chartering a New Course: Revoking the Corporations’ 
Rights To Exist, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct./Nov. 2002, at 8. 
195 See id. (“ ‘[R]evoking corporate charters’ means . . . dismantling harm-
inducing corporations by revoking their right to exist.”). 
196 See Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
197 Piercing the corporate veil is a rare remedy, employed only when necessary to 
prevent fraud or achieve equity. Several factors are to be considered when 
determining whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil, such as when 
there is a unity of interest and ownership where the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist and also where allowing the fiction of 
a corporation to exist would promote injustice. See id.  
198 But see Sahni, supra note 71, at 37 (“[T]he remedy of ‘piercing the corporate 
veil’ is incompatible with a practical interpretation of ‘Company Law.’ The corporate 
group has replaced the single company as the predominant unit of business activity. 
The ‘veil theory’ lacks recognition of the facets and complexities of multi-tiered 
enterprises.”). 
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when it is clear that the corporation is a mere sham or façade for 
individual actors.199  It does not apply to those situations where 
the corporation is a viable separate entity.200
The third method is currently being employed by two 
Pennsylvania townships.  These localities have each passed a law 
that strips corporations of legal privileges as persons, in essence 
dissolving the corporation before it has had the chance to commit 
the human rights violations.
 
201  While this solution has the 
advantage of being proactive, it is countered by the notion that it 
is treating all corporations, good and bad, as the same.  There is 
also the economic argument that employing such a seemingly 
harsh method would chill investment by businesses in those 
communities because of a fear of individual liability.202
These methods of attacks, while currently applied only at the 
national level, could be transferred to the international level as 
well.  This could take the form of a rider attached to a human 
rights declaration stating that any TNC who conducts business 
within a signatory’s borders must abide by human rights norms, 
lest liability and potential dissolution attach.  This would seem 
like a favorable option for states, allowing some of the pressure 
from current human rights advocates to be assumed by the TNCs 
within their borders.   
   
These situations also take into consideration the two 
distinctions between the TNC and the human bystander 
addressed above.  The level of state involvement that is 
contemplated by at least two of these solutions would, if applied 
correctly, aid in balancing the power differential that a TNC 
would wield.  In addition, attaching these standards to an 
international law or treaty would prevent TNCs from forum  
 
 
 
 
199 See Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 570; see also Sahni, supra note 71, at 6. 
200 See Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 570. 
201 THE CORPORATION, supra note 90; see also Press Release, Cmty. Envtl. Legal 
Def. Fund, Pennsylvania Township Is Second To Strip Sludge Corporation of 
“Rights”—Joins Tamaqua Borough To Become Second Municipality in the United 
States To Recognize the Rights of Nature (Sept. 28, 2006), http://www.celdf.org/ 
article.php?id=519. 
202 One counter, however, to that oft-cited argument is that, if enough 
communities banded together to institute these practices, the corporation would 
have no choice but to abide by these conditions. 
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shopping their business based on a state’s current human rights 
standards, something that lends itself to the transient nature of 
the TNC.203
V. BRINGING THE BYSTANDER RHETORIC INTO THE DEBATE 
 
A complete analysis of the various corporate accountability 
mechanisms under the bystander language is beyond the scope of 
this Article.204
A. What’s in a Name? 
  There are, however, some basic questions raised 
by this new paradigm that should, at least initially, be explored.  
Two central questions this Article explores are (1) how does the 
name “bystander” change how we think about TNCs, and 
(2) what are the ramifications of incorporating the bystander 
rhetoric into the corporate accountability debate? 
As discussed earlier, naming the TNC as a “bystander” 
under international law has an enormous amount of peril.  
Rather than creating a new paradigm that will form the basis of 
a meaningful debate on the subject, there is the chance that 
TNCs instead will openly embrace the term “bystander,” but only 
as a label by which to actively avoid liability.  This public 
relations coup might be inevitable.  By engaging in a thoughtful 
and thorough analysis of what it means to be a bystander, much 
of the wind may be taken out of the TNCs’ sails in this regard.  
While the idea of a bystander does often connote an image of 
innocence, the lessons from scholars who have written about the 
Holocaust and other genocides highlight that, in fact, bystanders 
are often morally complicit or at least morally ambiguous.205
 
203 This is based on the presumption that human rights treaties will be as widely 
adopted with these riders as they currently are without them. 
  Any 
204 This Article is part of a larger research agenda that examines the role of the 
transnational corporation using a bystander methodology. Subsequent articles will 
focus on using the bystander methodology as a basis for creating other constructs 
under international law. The author is particularly interested in the idea of non-
feasance concepts under American law and how they can fit in with the notion of 
international accountability. 
205 See Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and Its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 253–54 (2008) (discussing the need for bystanders to 
reconcile with the families of victims of genocide in Rwanda); Monica Hakimi, State 
Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 353–54 (2010) (discussing bases 
for state bystander responsibility for human rights violations). See generally 
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serious discussion on what it means to be a bystander should 
include these underlying notions of ambiguity.  Applying the 
name “bystander” to a TNC does not provide absolution to the 
corporation.  Rather, it can move us forward to a workable 
framework that encompasses the notion of passivity—something 
currently lacking in any international legal framework for the 
TNC.  While using passivity as a basis of liability is unusual, it is 
not unheard of—it must simply involve a shift in our notions of 
rights and duties by and among TNCs.  While using the name 
“bystander” is by no means a panacea to the issue of corporate 
accountability under international law, it is a step forward from 
our current legal framework. 
B. Incorporating the Bystander Rhetoric into the Corporate 
Accountability Debate 
The idea of using the bystander rhetoric specifically within 
the area of corporate accountability can also have many 
consequences, both foreseeable and unforeseeable.  For instance, 
if a meaningful framework for corporate accountability could be 
developed based on this bystander rhetoric, one potential 
consequence is that TNCs will simply shift their litigation 
strategy from that of the innocent bystander to denying 
completely that the underlying wrong took place.  While that is a 
potential danger, in the end this would be a difficult shift for 
TNCs to make.  Many of the underlying wrongs that have 
occurred—such as environmental injuries, the killing of citizens 
by guerillas employed by TNCs, and deplorable working 
conditions for the indigenous population—have been well 
documented and are beyond dispute.206
 
BARNETT, supra note 25 (offering a nuanced view of the role of bystanders during the 
Holocaust that takes into account both their potential innocence and complicity).  
  By denying that these 
incidents even took place in the face of uncontroverted evidence, 
TNCs would face a huge credibility gap that could impact their 
position both in this and in subsequent liability.  That does not 
mean that TNCs will not do it—witness for instance, the denial 
by tobacco companies of the addictive nature of their product 
206 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights Defenders, ¶¶ 9–11, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/223 (Aug. 4, 2010); see also Steven Greenhouse, Suit Says 18 Companies 
Conspired To Violate Sweatshop Workers’ Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at 
A9 (reporting lawsuits filed against eighteen U.S. retailers and apparel companies 
alleging sweatshop practices in Saipan). 
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even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary207
CONCLUSION 
—
however, it does weaken the TNCs’ position and strategy 
significantly. 
The position set forth in this Article is unsettling.  Because 
TNCs employ the innocent bystander rhetoric, sometimes 
corporations who are witnesses to very bad acts cannot be held 
liable under current legal theories.  Moreover, the gap in current 
international law is such that even when those corporations 
affirmatively act in committing human rights violations, they can 
still escape legal responsibility.  Part of this has come from the 
power that TNCs have claimed in labeling themselves 
“bystanders”—that is, innocent bystanders—under the law. 
Perhaps what needs to be reassessed then is not so much the 
rhetoric that the TNCs are using, but the implications of what 
that rhetoric means from a standpoint of accountability.  Implicit 
in this notion is the idea that the TNC as “innocent bystander” is 
free of moral and legal culpability.  By recasting the “bystander” 
name into one that involves, at the least, moral, if not legal, 
complicity, then perhaps a theory of accountability can be 
developed that will close the loophole TNCs rely upon in their 
rhetoric.  Doing so may lead to a workable understanding of 
corporate accountability that moves beyond mere words to action. 
In the end, to name the TNC as a “bystander” is “to know 
who [they] are, and who they are meant to be.”208  A TNC’s 
inaction when faced with underlying corporate accountability 
issues holds just as much power as any overt action it employs.  
A bystander?  Yes.  Innocent?  Definitely not.  Its power is too far 
flung to be viewed as anything but a critical part of the equation.  
National corporate and regulatory schemes have long accepted 
and accounted for the “bystander defense” in their enforcement 
schemes against TNCs.  While the results have been 
inconsistent, a TNC’s attempt to use the “bystander defense” in 
human rights litigation is also beginning to falter.209
 
207 See Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc., No. A10-215, 2010 WL 5292065, at *15 
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2010). 
  The most 
208 L’ENGLE, supra note 1. 
209 See Norms, supra note 35, ¶ 1 (“Within their respective spheres of activity 
and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the 
obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect 
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effective strategies will anticipate this language head-on and 
either counter it or assimilate it into the larger enforcement 
scheme.  To do otherwise will allow the innocent bystander to 
control the human rights agenda while atrocities continue to 
happen in the bystander’s name. 
To name something is to give it belonging.  By naming the 
TNC as “bystander,” this Article attempts to bring the TNC into 
the debate, squarely where it belongs: as a key component of a 
triad that includes the oppressor, the victim, and the bystander—
all of whom have integral roles to play.  Unlike the label of 
“innocent bystander” that the TNCs through their rhetoric are 
currently employing, naming the TNC as “bystander” brings it to 
the forefront of the act and shows that even its inaction creates 
real and specific consequences for the people within its influence. 
 
 
 
 
human rights . . . .”); see also Press Release, Cmty. Envtl. Legal Def. Fund, supra 
note 201 (“The Rush Township law . . . asserts that corporations doing business in 
Rush will henceforth be treated as ‘state actors’ under the law, and thus, be required 
to respect the rights of people and natural communities within the Township . . . .”).  
